Libertarian free will (as opposed to compatibilism) is defined as the ability to choose A or non-A.
Is libertarian free will (LFW) true?
It is necessarily true since otherwise one couldn't evaluate the truth value of the question "Is LFW true?" because you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth
There is one exception which would be if one were epistemologically infallible. This would then give a solid foundation for truth under determinism.
Yet this is obviously false since it is possible for me to argue, and believe to be true, that 2+2=3 which demonstrates that I must have varying degrees of determined fallibility (assuming determinism). And since fallible determinism gives no foundation for truth we must again reject determinism.
Therefore LFW is true.
What does this imply? (Or how can we metaphysically justify the existence of LFW)
We cannot be purely material beings since we would be determined by our neurological pathways or other laws of nature.
If we were then you are either stuck with cast iron laws of nature which results in cast ironly determined "choices", or accept quantum randomness which implies a complete scatter gun type "choice".
And as above this gives no foundation for truth and therefore must be rejected.
This implies then a substance dualism (trichotomy or more) of man since can provide a foundation for real choices as it can be neither random nor subject cast iron laws. At present I can't elaborate on what this non-material substance is apart from the fact it provides the necessary metaphysical foundation for LFW.
Finally it implies that the will is basic and as such causes itself.
2 comments:
It is necessarily true since otherwise one couldn't evaluate the truth value of the question "Is LFW true?" because you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth
I don't see the connection between whether our choices are predetermined and whether we can know truth. Why is determined fallibility more of a problem for truth than indeterminate fallibility?
If determinism is true, you can still evaluate the truth value of the question: your evaluation is predetermined, but you can still get things right or wrong.
"Can we know truth?" is a different question from "Can we know truth by using libertarian free will?"
If determinism is true, you can still evaluate the truth value of the question: your evaluation is predetermined, but you can still get things right or wrong.
First let us define the conditions under which someone can know whether something is true (here I steal a set up from a guy I debated with on this issue)
1. A truth exists. (This is necessarily the case since to deny it presupposes it and therefore, in principle, knowledge thereof
2. It is in principle knowable.
3. One has a method by which to determine whether to believe it is true, false or indeterminate. (Belief is basic by necessity)
Now supposing that you believe at time t that statement x is true. Now at time t+1 you evaluate your belief and demonstrate, by using the laws of logic or some empirical evidence, that the statement is in fact false.
If determinism is true then you would be in the odd situation in which you can identify whether a statement is true yet you cannot change your belief. From which it would follow that you cannot change you belief on the basis of its truth value which would therefore undermine the truth value of all your beliefs; in fact one could argue that this separation of belief and knowledge undercuts the cogency of knowledge itself. The only situation under determinism which you can change your belief is if you were determined to change it at t+1 which would be question begging.
Therefore determinism gives no foundation for the knowledge of truth.
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